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Abstract
Common sense supports prevention policies aimed at improving sur-
vival prospects among the population. It is also widely acknowledged that
an early death is a serious disadvantage, and that attention should be paid
to the compensation of short-lived individuals. This paper re-examines
the compatibility of those two concerns: prevention against early death
and compensation for early death. We show that, under mild conditions,
no social ordering on allocations can satisfy a concern for prevention and
a concern for compensation. The reason is that if it is socially desirable
to raise the number of survivors through prevention, it must also be, un-
der costly prevention, desirable to deteriorate the living standards of the
short-lived. We then explore two approaches to the prevention / compen-
sation dilemma, and study the associated optimal allocation of resources.
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1 Introduction
Death is the unique certain event of every human life. That unique sure thing
gives rise, at the individual level, to three major types of reactions. A rst
reaction is to try to forget death. A second reaction is to try to postpone death
as much as possible. A third reaction consists of trying to make death as benign
as possible, by reducing the disadvantage associated to it.
At the social level, the rst reaction seems hardly reasonable: one would
certainly not like a society that treats its citizens as if these were invulnerable.
On the contrary, one may expect from a fair or a good society to do as much as
possible to postpone the death of its citizens, and to make their death as benign
as possible. Those two requirements invite public policies of various kinds.
On the one hand, the desire to postpone death invites massive prevention
programs against premature death. Although longevity inequalities are largely
due to factors on which individuals have little control (e.g. genes, pollution,
early childhood), it remains true that longevity is partly endogenous: a per-
son can, to some extent, inuence his life expectancy by adopting more or less
healthy lifestyles.1 Hence there is a strong support for prevention policies dif-
fusing the healthy ways of life. In the light of the signicant impact of lifestyles
on mortality, such policies could have a large impact. For instance, Balia and
Jones (2008), in their study on premature mortality in Great Britain, correcting
for biases due to endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity, nd that lifestyles
predict about 25 percent of the overall inequality in mortality, with strong con-
tributions of smoking and sleep patterns.2
On the other hand, there also exists a strong support for making death as
benign as possible. A premature death is a serious disadvantage, which gives
rise to large inequalities in well-being across individuals. From the point of
view of social justice, such inequalities are unacceptable, and there is a strong
appeal for compensating the short-lived, by reducing the disadvantage due to
death as much as possible. Compensating the short-lived seems, at rst glance,
infeasible, since short-lived persons can be neither identied ex ante nor a¤ected
ex post (after their longevity is revealed). However, as shown by Fleurbaey et
al (2011), such a compensation can be carried out under general conditions, by
concentrating the consumption of resources on the early ages of life.3 Replacing
smoothed or increasing consumption proles by decreasing consumption proles
reduces the disadvantage due to early death.
Those two concerns - i.e. postponing death and making it benign - are both
intuitive, and their corollaries in terms of policies are in conformity with common
sense. A massive prevention against early death and the compensation of the
short-lived seem to be equally desirable. From the perspective of social justice,
1On the impact of genes on longevity inequalities, see Christensen et al (2006).
2Other studies on the same topic include: Auster et al (1969), Mullahy and Portney (1990),
Mullahy and Sindelar (1996), and Contoyannis and Jones (2004).
3The compensation proposed by Fleurbaey et al (2011) follows the lines of the egalitarian-
equivalent approach to social justice (discussed below). Note that such a policy requires the
knowledge, by the government, of the statistical distribution of the age at death.
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those two concerns both favour equality, but on di¤erent grounds. Massive
prevention favours the equality of longevities within the population, while the
compensation of the short-lived favours the equality of standards of living among
agents with unequal longevities. Egalitarians should thus want them both.
However, the main nding of this paper is that there is tension between the
goal to postpone death as much as possible for everyone, and the goal to make
death as benign as possible for everyone. The reason for this tension is that
prevention may impose costs on all individuals and ultimately harm those who
die early in spite of sharing in the cost. We therefore explore the compatibility
between prevention against early death and compensation for early death.
To study this issue, we consider a pure exchange economy with a nite
population of nitely-lived individuals. In this economy there is a risk on the
length of life, and individuals can raise their life expectancy through health-
improving e¤orts (e.g. jogging). In this framework, we examine the possibility
to construct a social ordering on the set of all possible allocations (i.e. lifetime
consumption and prevention e¤orts proles for all agents), on the basis of several
axioms capturing our concerns for prevention and compensation.
Note that such a framework, although simple, captures two important fea-
tures of real life. First, the model emphasizes that the possibility to inuence
ones life expectancy does not coincide with a perfect control on actual longevity.
This is in conformity with empirical studies showing that lifestyles a¤ect survival
prospects on average, but that adopting a particular lifestyle does not guaran-
tee a certain longevity, since longevity remains inherently risky. Second, our
framework allows for the heterogeneity of individual preferences on (un)healthy
lifestyles. This heterogeneity in attitudes toward lifestyles is also in conformity
with real life. It is, for instance, a matter of fact that some persons like having
physical activities, whereas other persons hate this kind of activity. But given
that those heterogeneous preferences generate inequalities in life expectancies
and, possibly, in actual longevities, they can hardly be ignored.
In this framework, the concern for prevention takes the form of a simple
condition, the Survivors Numbers Count axiom, which states that, as soon as
it delivers a strictly longer life to some individuals (other things equal), a small
enough rise in the prevention e¤ort made by all individuals is socially desirable.
The concern for compensation, on the other hand, take the form of an axiom
called Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, E¤orts and Lifetimes (PDEPEL).
This axiom says that if we consider two agents who have the same longevity
and the same preferences, then a transfer from the richer agent to the poorer
agent constitutes a social improvement (everything else being unchanged).
Anticipating on our results, we show that, under mild conditions, such as the
Weak Pareto axiom and the Hansson Independence axiom, there exists no social
ordering on allocations satisfying both the Survivors Numbers Count axiom
and PDEPEL. In other words, it is impossible to satisfy both our concern for
prevention against early death and our concern for compensation for early death.
The reason is that if it is socially desirable to raise the number of survivors
through prevention (as implied by Survivors Numbers Count), it must also be
socially desirable, if prevention is costly, to deteriorate the living standards of
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the unlucky short-lived, which goes against compensation and equality concerns
(and thus against our Pigou-Dalton axiom). Hence attempts to postpone death
as much as possible conicts with attempts to make early death as benign as
possible.
Therefore some choice has to be made between those two natural reactions
in front of death. This paper explores two approaches to such dilemma.
A rst approach consists of giving the priority to compensation, by letting
the Survivors Numbers Count axiom aside. It can then be shown that, provided
we add another version of the Pigou-Dalton Principle (i.e., the Pigou-Dalton
Principle for Constant Consumption and Reference E¤ort and Lifetime  PD-
CCREL), the social ordering on allocations must satisfy the maximin property
on a particular index of well-being that we call the Constant Consumption
Prole Equivalent for Reference Lifetime and E¤ort (CCPERLE). That is, the
approach evaluates a particular social state by looking at the smallest consump-
tion the agents would accept in the replacement of their current situation, if they
could benet from longevity and e¤orts of reference.
A second approach consists of giving the priority to prevention, by letting
PDEPEL aside. Actually, the set of social ordering functions satisfying Weak
Pareto, Hansson Independence, Survivors Numbers Count and PDCCREL is
not empty, and within the class of social ordering functions satisfying those
axioms, there is a salient family of social ordering functions, which consists in
the social ordering functions involving a continuous and quasi-concave social
welfare function applied to CCPERLE levels.
Having derived these two alternative approaches to the dilemma between
prevention and compensation, we will then explore the precise form of the social
optimum in a simple 2-period economy where longevities are unequal, and where
agents, who di¤er in time preferences and in preferences towards e¤ort, can a¤ect
their life expectancy through dedication to prevention e¤ort. For this purpose,
we start considering a rst-best setting, in which individual preferences can
be observed by the social planner, but not individual longevities  only the
statistical distribution of deaths for all e¤ort levels is known ex ante. Then, we
also consider a second-best setting, in which individual preferences cannot be
observed.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the frame-
work. Section 3 presents plausible ethical axioms accounting for the prevention
and the compensation concerns, and shows that no social objective can satisfy
those axioms. Section 4 studies two approaches to the dilemma: priority to
compensation or priority to prevention. Section 5 examines the corresponding
social optima under a full observability of agentspreferences. Section 6 consid-
ers some extensions, including the second-best problem. Section 7 concludes.
2 The framework
The model describes the situation of a given nite population of agents with or-
dinal preferences over lifetime consumption and dedication proles. We consider
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a pure exchange economy.
The set of natural integers (resp., real numbers) is denoted N (resp., R).
Let N be the set of individuals, with cardinality jN j. The maximum possible
lifespan for any individual, i.e., the maximum number of periods that can ever
be lived, is denoted by T , with T 2 N and T > 1.
Each individual will have a particular lifetime consumption prole. Under
the assumption of non-negative consumptions, a lifetime consumption prole
for an individual i 2 N is a vector of dimension T or less.
Each individual also has a particular lifetime preventive e¤ort prole. Under
the assumption of non-negative e¤ort, a lifetime e¤ort prole for an individual
i 2 N is a vector of dimension T or less.4
For the simplicity of presentation, let us call the pair (ci; ei) the life of
individual i, and denote this life by xi = (ci; ei). Following this notation, the
set of all possible (individual) lives can be denoted by X =
ST
`=1
 
R`+  R`+

.
The longevity of an individual i with life xi is dened by a function  :
X ! N, such that  (xi) is the dimension of the lifetime consumption and e¤ort
proles, that is, the length of existence of individual i.
An allocation denes a consumption prole ci and a health e¤ort prole ei
for each individual in N . An allocation for N can also be written as a list of lives
for all members of N , that is, a vector xN := (xi)i2N 2 X jN j. We denote by
xij` the beginning of life of sublength ` of individual i with longevity  (xi) > `.
That part of life includes a consumption subprole, denoted by cij`, and an
e¤ort subprole, denoted by eij`.
Each individual i 2 N has well-dened preferences over the set of all pos-
sible lives X. His preferences are described by an ordering Ri (i.e. a reexive,
transitive and complete binary relation). For all xi 2 X, the indi¤erence set at
xi for Ri is dened as I(xi; Ri) := fx0i 2 X j x0iIixig. For any lives xi and x0i of
equal length, preference orderings on xi and x0i are assumed to be continuous,
convex and weakly monotonic in consumption (i.e. if we consider (ci; ei) and
(c0i; e
0
i), ci  c0i and ei = e0i imply xiRix0i, and ci  c0i and ei = e0i imply xiPix0i).
Note that we do not assume here monotonicity of preferences with respect to
health-improving e¤ort, that is, we leave open the possibility to have some in-
dividuals who like making health-improving e¤orts, whereas other individuals
dislike this kind of practice. However, we assume that for all lives xi 2 X; there
exists a life x with full length and with constant consumption (c; :::; c) 2 RT+
and e¤ort (e; :::; e) 2 RT+ such that xiIix, which means that no life is worse or
better than all lives with full longevity. This excludes lexicographic preferences
for which longevity is an absolute good or bad. Let < be the set of all preference
orderings on X satisfying these properties. A preference prole for N is a list
of preference orderings of the members of N , denoted RN := (Ri)i2N 2 <jN j.
Finally, it should be stressed here that the preferences of the agent, as de-
scribed by the ordering Ri on X, are assumed to be respectable preferences,
4Note that using such an e¤ort variable is a simplication. One could, instead, have
a monetary e¤ort (entering the budget constraint) or a temporal e¤ort (entering the time
constraint). We use a purely physical e¤ort on the grounds of analytical simplicity.
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in the sense that these are the preferences to be taken into account when as-
sessing the goodness and the fairness of allocations. Clearly, in the context of
health-a¤ecting choices, the occurrence of regrets is widespread, and such re-
grets reveal the existence of a tension between, on the one hand, the preferences
that governed the choices of agents (i.e. the ex ante preferences), and, on the
other hand, the preferences that agents use when evaluating their lives (i.e. the
ex post preferences).5 The existence of such a dual self raises the question of the
preferences to be taken into account in social valuations. Usually, there is a ten-
dency to consider that the most respectable preferences are the ones observed
towards the end of life, life being regarded as a period of learning about oneself.
Our approach will follow that standard view and take the ex post preferences
of agents into account, and not the ex ante preferences.
3 The social objective
The goal of this section is to examine the possibility to derive a social objective
that does justice to the prevention against an early death and to the compensa-
tion for an early death. For that purpose, we will, in a rst stage, present some
basic ethical axioms that social preferences ought to satisfy. Then, in a second
stage, we will propose two axioms that account for the ideas of preventing early
death within the population and compensating short-lived persons.
Social preferences will be formalized by a social ordering function % which
associates every admissible preference prole RN of the population with an
ordering %RN dened on the set of all possible allocations for N , that is, an
ordering dened on X jN j. For all xN , x0N 2 X jN j, xN &RN x0N means that
the allocation xN is, under the preference prole RN , at least as good as the
allocation x0N . The symbols RN and RN will denote strict preference and
indi¤erence, respectively.
A rst, standard axiom imposed on social preferences consists of the Weak
Pareto axiom, which states that if all individuals prefer one allocation to an-
other, then this should also be regarded as socially preferable to that alternative.
Axiom 1 (Weak Pareto) For all preference proles RN 2 <jN j, all alloca-
tions xN ; x0N 2 X jN j, if xiPix0i for all i 2 N , then xN RN x0N .
This axiom can be justied as a guarantee against the choice of ine¢ cient
allocations, or, alternatively, as a way to insure the respect for individual pref-
erences. In the context of health-a¤ecting choices, the reliance on the Pareto
axiom is quite liberal, since individual preferences may go against behaviors
maximizing individual health.
5For instance, Slovic (2001) found, on the basis of a telephone survey of a representative
sample of U.S. respondents, that 85 % of adult smokers stated that they would not start
smoking if they had to do it over again. That result is robust to various countries. In the
U.K., Jarvis et al (2002) showed that about 83 % of smokers "would not start smoking if
they had their time again". Finally, Fong et al (2004) showed, on the basis of a telephone
survey in Canada, the U.S., the U.K. and Australia, that about 90 % of smokers agree with
the statement "if you had to do it over again, you would not have started smoking"
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In the social choice literature, it is also common, in order to avoid Arrow-
type impossibility results, to impose the Hansson Independence axiom. That
condition, which was rst introduced by Hansson (1973) and Pazner (1979), re-
quires that social preferences over two allocations depend only on the individual
indi¤erence curves at these allocations.
Axiom 2 (Hansson Independence) For all preferences proles RN ; R0N 2
<jN j and for all allocations xN ; x0N 2 X jN j, if for all i 2 N , I(xi; Ri) = I (xi; R0i)
and I(x0i; Ri) = I (x
0
i; R
0
i), then xN %RN x0N if and only if xN %R0N x
0
N .
In comparison to Arrows Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, Hansson
Independence is much weaker, since the indi¤erence curves at the allocations un-
der consideration contain more information than individual pairwise preferences
over these two allocations. This is what preserves us from Arrows impossibility.
Let us now formulate, in the context of our economy, a concern for postpon-
ing death as much as possible. Such concern for prevention can take the form
of the Survivors Numbers Count axiom. This axiom states that, as soon as it
guarantees a strictly longer life to one person (and the same longevities for all
others), a general increase in preventive e¤ort is socially desirable.
Axiom 3 (Survivors Numbers Count) For all RN 2 <jN j, all xN , x0N 2
X jN j, all i 2 N , if  (xi) <  (x0i), if xi = x0ij(xi), xj = x0j for all j 6= i, and if
x0iPixi, then there exists a vector of e¤ort e
00
N  e0N such that:
(c0i; e
00
i )i2N %RN (xi)i2N
The Survivors Numbers Count axiom states that the certainty of lengthening
the life of one person justies, from a social perspective, a rise in the levels of
individual health e¤orts. This condition is quite intuitive, since the increase in
preventive e¤ort is not based here on the expectation of saving one life (as in
policy decisions), but, rather, on the absolute certainty to save one life.6
Regarding the concern for compensation, one way to capture this is by means
of the following version of the Pigou-Dalton compensation principle, which we
call here Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, E¤orts and Lifetimes (PDEPEL).
This axiom states that, for agents who are identical in terms of everything (i.e.
preferences, e¤ort, longevity) except their consumption, a transfer from the
agent with the higher consumption to the agent with the lower consumption is
a social improvement.
Axiom 4 (Pigou-Dalton for Equal Preferences, E¤orts and Lifetimes)
For all RN 2 <jN j, all xN , x0N 2 X jN j, and all i, j 2 N , if Ri = Rj, if
ei = e
0
i = ej = e
0
j,  (xi) =  (x
0
i) =  (xj) = 
 
x0j

= `, and there exists
 2 R`++ such that
c0i  ci = c0i     cj = c0j +   c0j
6At the stage of dening the social objective, it is important to posit basic principles like
"saving one life is worth some e¤ort" that bear on the evaluation of nal consequences. At
the stage of policy decisions, studied in later sections, one deals with statistical lives.
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and xk = x0k for all k 6= i; j, then
xN %RN x0N :
Although quite intuitive, the Pigou-Dalton principle is limited to individuals
with identical preferences and this is a very strong limitation. Social orderings
that give full priority to individuals having certain kinds of preferences, even
when they are extremely better o¤ than others, can satisfy this axiom.
In order to introduce some inequality aversion across individuals with dif-
ferent preferences, a natural candidate consists of the following axiom, which
is another version of the Pigou-Dalton principle. This axiom, called the Pigou-
Dalton Principle for Constant Consumption, and Reference E¤ort and Lifetime,
states that, if two agents have a longevity that is equal to a level of reference `,
as well as an e¤ort prole that is equal to a reference prole e, then a transfer
that lowers the constant consumption prole of the rich and raises the constant
consumption prole of the poor constitutes a social improvement, whatever their
preferences.
Axiom 5 (Pigou-Dalton for Constant Consumption, Reference E¤ort and Lifetime)
For all RN 2 <jN j, all xN , x0N 2 X jN j, and all i, j 2 N , such that ei = e0i =
ej = e
0
j = e
, and such that  (xi) =  (x0i) =  (xj) = 
 
x0j

= `, and xi and
xj are constant consumption proles, if there exists  2 R`++ such that
c0i  ci = c0i     cj = c0j +   c0j
and xk = x0k for all k 6= i; j, then
xN %RN x0N :
The restriction to specic situations (constant consumption, reference e¤ort
and longevity) is necessary for this axiom to remain compatible with Weak
Pareto, as is well known in social choice theory. It is intuitive that if one
wants to respect individual preferences, it is impossible to make interpersonal
comparisons in physical terms in all cases. This is the reason for this restriction,
which is not needed, by contrast, when the transfer is made between individuals
with identical preferences, and this explains the di¤erence between the two
Pigou-Dalton axioms introduced here.
The reference prole of health-improving e¤orts e and the reference longevity
` can be interpreted as follows. The reference e¤ort prole e and reference
longevity `are such that an external observer could, when comparing the lives
of two persons with the e¤ort prole e and the length `, say who is better
o¤ than the other by just looking at the constant consumption proles of those
agents, without knowing anything about their preferences. Thus the reference
levels of longevity and e¤orts allow the comparison of agents well-being di-
rectly from their consumption, without caring for their preferences. Naturally,
the reference e¤orts prole e and reference longevity ` are ethical parame-
ters, whose selection can, in combination with the Weak Pareto axiom, have
important redistributive consequences.
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The ve axioms dened above seem quite appealing, and one would like
social preferences to satisfy all of them. However, as stated in the following
proposition, the rst four axioms are logically incompatible.
Theorem 1 There exists no social ordering function % dened on <jN j satis-
fying Weak Pareto, Hansson Independence, PDEPEL, and Survivors Numbers
Count.
The proof of this result is simple and we only provide a sketch of the argu-
ment. By a direct adaptation of arguments developed in Fleurbaey et al. (2011),
one shows that Weak Pareto, Hansson Independence, and PDEPEL imply an
absolute priority for the worse-o¤ individuals. That is, if two persons i and j
have the same preferences, but i lies on a higher indi¤erence curve than j, push-
ing i on a lower indi¤erence curve and j on a higher one is socially desirable,
whatever the relative size of the shift for the two agents.
However, absolute priority for the worse-o¤ conicts with the Survivors
Numbers Count axiom under general assumptions on individual preferences.
To see this, let us rst remind that this latter axiom states that, as soon as
this guarantees the rise in the longevity of one person (and no change in others
longevities), a generalized rise in the preventive e¤ort levels in the population is
socially desirable. Note, however, that such a generalized rise in prevention can
be damageable to the worse-o¤ individuals. Take the case where the worse-o¤
individuals are short-lived persons who do not like health e¤orts. If some addi-
tional preventive e¤ort is imposed to them  without increasing their longevity
 those persons are made worse o¤ than before, and so rising the overall pre-
vention level in the name of the rise in one persons longevity contradicts the
priority given to the worse-o¤s. Hence some choice is to be made between the
Pigou-Dalton axiom and the Survivors Numbers Count axiom.
Before drawing the corollaries from that result, it should be noticed that if
some restrictions were imposed on individual preferences, the above impossibil-
ity would no longer prevail. If, for instance, individual preferences are monotonic
not only in consumption, but also in preventive e¤ort, then imposing a general
rise in preventive e¤ort will not worsen the situation of the worse-o¤ individuals,
and, thus, will not contradict our absolute priority to the worse-o¤s.
Having stressed this, it remains that there is no obvious reason why one
should impose the monotonicity of individual preferences with respect to e¤ort.
Hence, the above impossibility highlights a true dilemma: social preferences
cannot exhibit both a concern for the number of survivors and a priority to
the worse o¤. One cannot care both about the prevention against an early
death, and about the compensation for an early death. A choice must be made
between those two concerns, which appear equally reasonable. The rest of the
paper explores two distinct approaches to that dilemma.
4 Two approaches
We will explore here two distinct branches made salient by the above dilemma.
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On the one hand, a rst approach consists of giving up the concern for
prevention against a premature death, while keeping the concern for compen-
sating the short-lived. This can been done by relaxing the Survivors Numbers
Count axiom, and by characterizing the social preferences in a context where
the compensation of the short-lived matters.
On the other hand, one can keep the concern for a wide prevention against
an early death, while giving less priority to the concern for compensating the
short-lived. This can be done by keeping the Survivors Numbers Count axiom,
while adopting a modied version of the Pigou-Dalton principle.
The rest of this section will explore these two solutions.
4.1 Priority to compensation
Let us now explore the rst approach, which does not require social preferences
to satisfy the Survivors Numbers Count axiom. The question is whether this
implies completely giving up any concern for prevention.
The combination of the remaining four axioms su¢ ces to provide a partial
but relatively precise characterization of social preferences. In order to investi-
gate what kind of social preferences satisfy those conditions, let us rst dene
the Constant Consumption Prole Equivalent for Reference Lifetime and E¤ort
(CCPERLE).
Denition 1 (CCPERLE) For any i 2 N , any Ri 2 < and any xi 2 X,
the Constant Consumption Prole Equivalent for Reference Lifetime and E¤ort
(CCPERLE) of xi is the constant consumption prole c^i such that (c^i; e) = `
and
xiIi (c^i; e
)
where e is the reference e¤ort prole and ` is the reference longevity level.
The CCPERLE can be interpreted as the constant consumption path that
would, if combined with a reference e¤ort prole e and a reference longevity
`, make the agent indi¤erent with his current life. As such, the CCPERLE
can be regarded as a way to homogenize consumptions across individuals, by
converting consumptions under di¤erent e¤orts and longevities into some com-
parable consumptions. The intuition goes as follows. In the present context,
where agents may have unequal e¤orts and unequal longevities, looking at con-
sumption proles does not su¢ ce to have an idea of individual well-being. A
given consumption per period does not yield the same well-being if it is associ-
ated with a high or a low health e¤ort, or if it is enjoyed during a more or less
long life. However, the CCPERLE allows us to have a precise view of agents
well-being, since it has, by construction, taken e¤ort and longevity di¤erentials
into account.7
7Note that the CCPERLE of xi always exists if ` = T , by our assumptions made on <,
but the existence of the CCPERLE is not guaranteed if ` < T: It may happen that xi with
high longevity is strictly preferred to all lifetime consumption proles with lower longevity `:
When this happens, we adopt the convention that the CCPERLE is innite. This problem
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It is straightforward to see that, if ci is a constant consumption prole with
(ci; e
) = `, the CCPERLE is equal to the consumption prole, i.e. c^i = ci.
However, if ci is a constant consumption prole with an e¤ort prole equal
to the reference prole (i.e. ei = e) but with a longevity ` lower than the
reference longevity `, then we have c^i ? ci, depending on whether ci lies above
or below the critical level making a longer life with that consumption worth
being lived. Moreover, if ci is a constant consumption prole with ` = ` but
with an e¤ort prole lower than the reference prole (i.e. ei  e), then we
have c^i 7 ci, depending on whether the agent likes or dislikes making health-
improving e¤orts. If the agent regards e¤ort as desirable, imposing the higher
reference e¤ort prole to him would require, to bring indi¤erence with his initial
situation, a lower consumption prole, yielding c^i < ci. On the contrary, if the
agent dislikes making e¤ort, imposing a higher e¤ort level e  ei will require
to raise his consumption prole, in such a way as to maintain indi¤erence with
the situation with a lower e¤ort. Then, in that case, we will have c^i > ci.
Therefore, when the reference e¤ort prole is higher than the actual e¤ort level,
our equivalent is lower for the agents with a taste for e¤ort, and higher for
agents who dislike e¤orts, ceteris paribus.
Having dened the CCPERLE, we can now present the following theorem,
which characterizes the social preferences, or, more precisely, states that the
Maximin on CCPERLE is a necessary condition for social optimality.
Theorem 2 Assume that the social ordering function % satises axioms Weak
Pareto, Hansson Independence, PDEPEL and PDCCREL on <jN j. Then % is
such that for all RN 2 <jN j, all xN , x0N 2 X jN j,
min
i2N
(c^i) > min
i2N
(c^0i) =) xN RN x0N :
This theorem is an immediate extension of Th. 1 in Fleurbaey et al. (2010).
As explained in the previous section, the combination of Weak Pareto, Hansson
Independence and PDEPEL implies absolute priority for the worse-o¤ among
agents having the same preferences. Adding PDCCREL to the list forces inter-
personal comparisons to be made in terms of CCPERLE.
It should be noted that this theorem does not give a full characterization of
social preferences because it does not say how to compare allocations for which
min (c^i) = min (c^
0
i).
8 All the theorem states is that if one allocation exhibits a
higher minimum CCPERLE than another, then it must also be socially more
desirable. In other words, the theorem implies that maximizing min (c^i) is a
necessary operation, as the best social allocation is necessarily included in the
set of allocations that maximize min (c^i). Note, however, that in most concrete
problems, it is likely that the Maximin on CCPERLE has, as a solution, a
of non-existence is not very important as the social preferences highlighted here focus on the
worst-o¤ individuals.
8Clearly, given the postulated axioms, the equality of the min (c^i) for two allocations does
not necessarily imply social indi¤erence between these allocations: an allocation could still be
regarded as better than the other (on the grounds of other aspects of the distribution), and
the theorem has nothing to say about that.
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unique allocation, in which case that allocation must also be the most socially
desirable allocation. When a unique solution is not obtained, it is natural to
rene the Maximin into the Leximin, which extends the lexicographic priority
of the worse-o¤ to higher ranks in the distribution.
4.2 Priority to prevention
The alternative approach consists in dropping the rst Pigou-Dalton axiom
and reintroducing Survivors Numbers Count. There are many social ordering
functions that satisfy the list of axioms made of Weak Pareto, Hansson Inde-
pendence, Survivors Numbers Count and PDCCREL. Some of them violate the
principle of anonymity, or give di¤erent degrees of priority to various individuals
as a function of properties of their indi¤erence sets.
However, there is a salient family in the class of social ordering functions
satisfying these axioms. Consider two additional and standard axioms.
Axiom 6 (Continuity) For all RN 2 <jN j, all xN 2 X jN j, the setsn
x0N 2 X jN j j xN %RN x0N
o
and
n
x0N 2 X jN j j x0N %RN xN
o
are closed.
Axiom 7 (Separability) For all RN 2 <jN j, all xN , x0N 2 X jN j, all M  N , 
xM ; xNnM

%RN
 
x0M ; xNnM
, xM ; x0NnM %RN x0M ; x0NnM :
One then obtains the following result, characterizing what we will call the
Sum of Transformed CCPERLE.
Theorem 3 Assume that the social ordering function % satises Weak Pareto,
Hansson Independence, Continuity, Separability, and PDCCREL on <jN j. Then
Survivors Numbers Count is also satised, and there is an increasing concave
function ' : R+ ! R such that for all RN 2 <jN j, all xN , x0N 2 X jN j,
xN %RN x0N ,
X
i2N
' (c^i) 
X
i2N
' (c^0i) :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that this second approach retains a concern for prevention without
completely dropping the ideal of compensation. Seeking equality in terms of
CCPERLE implies giving some priority to the worse-o¤. It may happen that
for individuals who are far from the reference longevity and e¤ort, and for
particular preferences, the social ordering fails to give priority to the distribution
of consumption c to the worse-o¤ as measured by CCPERLE. But the ordering
never fails to give priority to the worse-o¤ who are at the reference levels, and
the more inequality averse the function W; the more this priority extends to
situation away from the reference levels.
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5 First-best optimum
The previous section explored two approaches to the dilemma between preven-
tion against early death and compensation for early death. We showed that, if
priority is given to compensation, basic axioms on social preferences imply that
the optimal allocation must maximize the minimum CCPERLE in the popula-
tion. On the contrary, if the survivors number matters, then, provided we add
another version of the Pigou-Dalton principle, a wide class of social objective
can satisfy our ethical requirements, including social welfare functions that are
continuous and quasi-concave in individual CCPERLE levels, and allows for
various arbitrages between compensation and prevention concerns.
This section characterizes, under these two alternative social objectives, the
social optimum in a resource allocation problem where individuals, who face
risky lifetime, di¤er in time preferences and in (dis)utility from prevention.
5.1 Environment
Consider an economy where agents live either one or two periods. The length of
life of each agent is only known ex post. Ex ante, the social planner knows indi-
vidual preferences, as well as the statistical distribution of individual longevities
for each level of e¤ort.9 The social planner, who can monitor individual e¤ort,
looks for the optimum allocation of an endowment W of resources.
Heterogeneity concerns two aspects of preferences: time preferences i and
attitude towards e¤ort vj . Some agents assign a high weight to the future (old
age), whereas others are less patient, and assign a low weight to the future.
Some agents like prevention e¤ort (e.g. jogging), whereas others dislike it.
For simplicity, individual lifetime welfare takes a standard time-additive
form, which is separable in the utility or disutility of e¤ort:
U1ij = u(cij) + vj (eij) ;
U2ij = u(cij) + vj (eij) + iu(dij);
where cij , dij and eij denote rst- and second-period consumptions and e¤ort
of an agent with a time preference factor i and an utility from e¤ort vj , while
U1ij and U
2
ij denote his actual lifetime utility if he lives respectively one or two
periods. Temporal utility u() takes the same form for everyone, unlike the
utility from e¤ort, which is type-specic, under the form of vj ().10 We assume
that there exists some consumption c such that u(c) = 0.11
Ex ante, agents are standard expected-utility maximizers:
EUij = u(cij) + vj (eij) +  (eij)iu(dij);
where EUij denotes the expected utility of an agent with time preference i
and attitude towards e¤ort vj (eij). The expression  (eij) denotes the survival
9The latter piece of information amounts, in the present context, to know how the indi-
vidual e¤ort level a¤ects the life expectancy of agents.
10As usual, we assume: u0(cij) > 0 and u00(cij) < 0:
11This amount to assume that u(0) < 0, which is standard (see Becker et al. 2005).
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function for an agent making an e¤ort eij . As usual, we assume (0) = ~ > 0,
0 () > 0, 00 () < 0 and that there exists a maximum e¤ort level e, so that
(e) =  < 1.
Heterogeneity takes the following form. Ex ante, agents di¤er in their time
preferences, i, and in their attitude towards e¤ort, vj , with two types for each.
For time preferences, type-1j agents are less patient than type-2j agents:
0 < 1 < 2 < 1
Regarding e¤ort, we assume that type-i1 agents dislike e¤orts, whereas type-
i2 agents like e¤ort. For simplicity, we assume that vj () = jv () with v(0) =
0; v()  0, v0() > 0 and v00() > 0, with:
1 < 0 < 2
Hence, there exist 4 types of agents ex ante, who are di¤erentiated by their
i and j . Ex post, there are 8 types of agents, as each ex ante type includes
short-lived and long-lived agents.12
We assume that the social planner can allocate resources as rst-period or
second-period consumptions without any cost, but that agents cannot transfer
resources across periods freely, so that the bundles (received from the planner)
have to be consumed in the same periods as they are received.13 Within that
framework, the problem of the social planner consists in o¤ering four consump-
tion and e¤ort bundles (cij ; dij ; eij) to agents with time preference parameter
i and attitude towards e¤orts j , for i = 1; 2 and j = 1; 2. Note that these
bundles do not depend on whether agents live one or two periods, as the actual
length of life is not known ex ante by the planner.
The two social objectives considered here are the Maximin CCPERLE and
the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE. Note that, at rst glance, one might want
to consider simpler social objective functions, dened not in terms of CCPERLE
levels, but, rather, in terms of individual lifetime welfare levels. The problem is
that such an approach would presuppose a full comparability of individual life-
time welfare levels, which is problematic, since preference parameters i and j
then become, under that approach, scaling factors a¤ecting the social optimum
in an arbitrary way.14 Social objectives dened in terms of CCPERLE levels
are immunized against those comparability / aggregation problems.
5.2 Maximin CCPERLE
In the following, we solve the problem faced by a planner trying to maximize
the minimum CCPERLE, assuming that the planner can observe characteristics
i and j . For that purpose, we take the maximum length ` = 2 as a reference
level `, and the maximum e¤ort level e as the reference level of e¤ort e.
12We assume that there is a mass 1 of individuals in each of the ex ante groups.
13This amounts to assume that the social planner can fully tax the savings of individuals.
14There is, for instance, no obvious reason why, under zero e¤ort, e¤ort-lover and e¤ort-
averse individuals should be equally well-o¤. Moreover, there is no obvious reason why impa-
tient agents should have a lower lifetime welfare than patient agents ceteris paribus.
14
By denition, the CCPERLE for an agent of type
 
i; j

with an actual
length of life ` = 1; 2 is the constant consumption prole (c^ij`; c^ij`) such that:
u (c^ij2) + jv(e) + iu (c^ij2) = u (cij) + jv(eij) + iu (dij)
u (c^ij1) + jv(e) + iu (c^ij1) = u (cij) + jv(eij)
On the rst line, c^ij2 denes the consumption equivalent of an agent with time
preference i and attitude towards e¤ort j who e¤ectively lived two periods,
while the second line denes a consumption equivalent c^ij1 for a
 
i; j

-type
agent living only one period. Note that since we take ex-post utilities on the
right-hand side of these expressions, the CCPERLE of an agent does not de-
pend on his survival probability. However, the ex post lifetime welfare does
depend on individual health-a¤ecting e¤ort, through its impact on rst-period
welfare. Thus, if individual e¤ort depends on the survival function, this will
a¤ect indirectly the level of the consumption equivalent for a given longevity.
Let us rst dene the consumption equivalent (c^ij`; c^ij`) for each of the 8
groups of individuals that emerge ex post.
  ` def. CCPERLE c^ij`
1 1 1 u (c^111) (1 + 1) + 1v(e) = u (c11) + 1v(e11)
1 2 1 u (c^121) (1 + 1) + 2v(e) = u (c12) + 2v(e12)
2 1 1 u (c^211) (1 + 2) + 1v(e) = u (c21) + 1v(e21)
2 2 1 u (c^221) (1 + 2) + 2v(e) = u (c22) + 2v(e22)
1 1 2 u (c^112) (1 + 1) + 1v(e) = u (c11) + 1v(e11) + 1u (d11)
1 2 2 u (c^122) (1 + 1) + 2v(e) = u (c12) + 2v(e12) + 1u (d12)
2 1 2 u (c^212) (1 + 2) + 1v(e) = u (c21) + 1v(e21) + 2u (d21)
2 2 2 u (c^222) (1 + 2) + 2v(e) = u (c22) + 2v(e22) + 2u (d22)
The problem of the social planner can thus be written as follows:
max
cij ;dij ;eij
min(c^111;c^121;c^211;c^221;c^112;c^122;c^212;c^222)
s.to c11 + (e11)d11 + c21 + (e21)d21 + c12 + (e12)d12 + c22 + (e22)d22 W
where the CCPERLE c^ij` are dened in the above table.
The solution to that social planning problem is represented below.
Proposition 1 Under perfect information about ex-ante types
 
i; j

, and
(4 + 2~ + 2) c W , the Maximin CCPERLE optimum involves:
c < c11 < c

12; c

21 < c

22
d11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 = c
e11 = e

21 = 0 < e

12 = e

22 = e
That consumption, e¤ort prole leads to an equalization of CCPERLE among
ex ante groups, but may not prevent inequalities within ex ante groups:
c^121 = c^

122  c^111 = c^112 and c^221 = c^222  c^211 = c^212
c^211 = c^

212  c^111 = c^112 and c^221 = c^222  c^121 = c^122
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The Maximin CCPERLE optimum exhibits three major features.
First, it provides a consumption c to all agents at the old age. Indeed, if
dij exceeds c, long-lived agents are better o¤ than short-lived agents. Hence,
redistributing dij   c towards the young increases the welfare of the short-lived.
Inversely, if dij < c, the worst-o¤agents are the long-lived, so that redistributing
towards them until dij = c would raise the welfare of the worst-o¤s. Hence we
must have dij = c.15
Second, the Maximin CCPERLE imposes zero prevention e¤ort on agents
who dislike prevention. The reason is that, since some e¤ort-averse agents will
turn out to be short-lived despite prevention, the welfare of those short-lived
agents is denitely increased by allowing them to avoid prevention e¤ort. The
same is not true for e¤ort-loving agents, for whom it is always optimal to allow
them to do the maximum e¤ort, whatever they survive to the old age or not.
Third, the Maximin CCPERLE discriminates, at the young age, between
agents with di¤erent ex ante characteristics. The priority given to patient agents
(for a given attitude towards prevention) is not surprising, since patient agents
are more a¤ected by a short life than impatient agents. Regarding the priority
given to those who like prevention, the intuition goes as follows. Agents who
dislike e¤ort tend to choose an e¤ort level that is inferior to the reference
e¤ort, and this su¢ ces to make these appear "better o¤" than the agents who
like e¤orts and practice the reference e¤ort. Hence, when one measures the well-
being of agents by using the maximum e¤ort level as a reference, the CCPERLE
of the patient who likes e¤ort is necessarily lower, for an equal rst-period
consumption, than the CCPERLE of the patient who dislikes e¤ort. Hence the
Maximin CCPERLE leads to higher rst-period consumption for agents who
like prevention (under given time preferences).
All in all, the Maximin CCPERLE achieves a full compensation with respect
to the length of life: for given i and j , there is, at the social optimum, an
equality of lifetime welfare, whatever individuals live long or not. However, there
may remain some welfare inequalities across agents with an equal longevity, but
these inequalities result from agentspreferences (di¤erent i or j), for which
they can be held responsible, unlike for a premature death.16
Regarding the prevention, imposing zero e¤ort levels to all agents who do
not life e¤ort may be shocking. Indeed, given that the proportion of survivors
in a group depends on the amount of e¤ort, imposing such a low e¤ort level
amounts to nothing less than reducing the number of survivors with respect to
what would have prevailed under, for instance, a generalized high e¤ort. But
the Maximin solution does not depend on the number of agents who are in each
situation (e.g. short-lived or long-lived), but only on how bad the situation of
the worse-o¤ is. This explains why it is optimal to impose e¤ort levels that are
minimal for agents who do not like e¤ort. Allowing large e¤orts for those agents
15That rationale is close to the one used in Fleurbaey et al (2011).
16On the distinction between "circonstances" characteristics and "responsibility" character-
istics, see Fleurbaey (2008).
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would make the short-lived members even worse-o¤ than without such e¤ort.17
That particular corollary of the Maximin CCPERLE is counterintuitive,
since there is a strong intuitive support for large preventive campaigns favouring
large levels of health-improving e¤orts, and leading, in ne, to a large number
of survivors. Obviously the Maximin CCPERLE, which does not care about
the number of survivors, but only about the situation of the short-lived, does
not legitimate such practices. The reason is that the Maximin CCPERLE gives
absolute priority to compensation concerns over prevention concerns.
5.3 Sum of Transformed CCPERLE
Let us now explore what the social optimum becomes under an alternative
approach to the compensation / prevention dilemma, which does not give up a
concern for massive prevention. As stated in Theorem 3, adding the Survivors
Numbers Count axiom to the Weak Pareto and Hansson Independence axiom,
while replacing the Pigou-Dalton Principle for Equal Preferences, E¤ort and
Lifetime (PDEPEL) by the Pigou-Dalton Principle for Constant Consumption
and Reference E¤ort and Lifetime (PDCCREL), implies, under Continuity and
Separability, that social preferences can be represented by a sum of transformed
CCPERLE ' (c^ij`), with '0 () > 0 and '00 () < 0.
For the purpose of this analytical application, we will take, as a social objec-
tive, Atkinsons isoelastic social welfare function, dened in terms of individual
CCPERLE (instead of individual utilities as usually done):18
W (c^N ) =
X
i;j;`
nij`
(c^ij`)
1    1
1  
where  reects the sensitivity of social preferences to inequalities in CCPERLE
among the population, while nij` is proportion of individuals of type ij with a
length of life `.19 That social objective includes the case where  = 0, in which
what is to be maximized is the sum of individualsCCPERLE. On the contrary,
when  tends to +1, the social objective is the Maximin on CCPERLE, which
gives absolute priority to the compensation of the dead.
Except in that special case, the isoelastic social objective function W (c^N )
does some justice to massive prevention. Indeed, instead of focusing only on
the worse-o¤ individuals, it ranks allocations by comparing aggregate outcomes
on the population as a whole. But despite that di¤erence, the informational
basis relevant for the ranking of allocations still remains individualsCCPERLE,
17The same conclusion remains true when the long-lived are the worst-o¤s. Note also that,
in that case, it is still optimal to allow e¤ort-lovers to do as much e¤ort as possible, since
e¤ort-lovers enjoy the e¤ort whatever they will survive or not to the old age. Thus there is
no argument for preventing them from making such e¤orts.
18See Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 340).
19By assumption, we have nij = 1 for all i; j, so that nij1 = (1   j)nij = 1   j , while
nij2 = jnij = j .
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which, under reference levels ` = 2 and e = e, is:
c^ij` = f
 
U `ij   jv(e)
1 + i
!
where f(x)  u 1(x). As u0(x) > 0 and u00(x) < 0, we have f 0(x) > 0 and
f 00(x) > 0: the CCPERLE is an increasing convex function. Using the notations
g (c^ij`)  (c^ij`)
1  1
1  , the transformed CCPERLE can be rewritten as:
g (c^ij`) = g  f
 
U `ij   jv(e)
1 + i
!
 h
 
U `ij   jv(e)
1 + i
!
where h(x)  g  f(x). Moreover, if one denotes f

U1ij jv(e)
1+i

 fij1 (cij ; eij)
and f

U2ij jv(e)
1+i

 fij2 (cij ; dij ; eij), we can dene hij1(cij ; eij)  gfij1 (cij ; eij)
and hij2(cij ; dij;eij)  g  fij2 (cij ; dij ; eij). Hence we have:
@hij1 (cij ; eij)
@cij
> 0 and
@hij1 (cij ; eij)
@eij
< 0 for j = 1
> 0 for j = 2
@hij2 (cij ; dij ; eij)
@cij
> 0;
@hij2 (cij ; dij ; eij)
@dij
> 0
@hij2 (cij ; dij ; eij)
@eij
< 0 for j = 1
> 0 for j = 2
It is not obvious to see whether the composed functions hij1(x) and hij2(x)
are concave or convex in their arguments. In order to guarantee the concavity
of the objective function to be maximized, we assume that the transformed
CCPERLEs are concave in their arguments (consumptions and prevention).20
This assumption is most likely to hold when inequality aversion is large.21
The social planners problem can be rewritten as:
max
cij ;dij ;eij
X
i;j
nij1hij1 (cij ; eij) +
X
i;j
nij2hij2(cij ; dij ; eij)
s.to c11 + (e11)d11 + c21 + (e21)d21 + c12 + (e12)d12 + c22 + (e22)d22 W
20This assumption can be written as:
@2hij1 (cij ; eij)
@c2ij
< 0;
@2hij1 (cij ; eij)
@e2ij
< 0
@2hij2 (cij ; dij ; eij)
@c2ij
< 0;
@2hij2 (cij ; dij ; eij)
@d2ij
< 0;
@2hij2 (cij ; dij ; eij)
@e2ij
< 0
21However, it is shown in the Appendix, by means of a simple analytical example, that this
assumption is actually quite weak, since it is, in general, satised even when the degree of
inequality aversion is zero (i.e.  = 0).
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Proposition 2 Under perfect information about ex-ante types
 
i; j

, and
(4 + 4) c W , the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE optimum involves:
ci1 < c

i2 8i(
c1j < c

2j when low  ()
c1j > c

2j when high  ()
cij > d

ij 8i; j
d22 > d

12; d

21 > d

11 > c
e12 = e

22 = e > e

21 > e

11 > 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus our alternative social optimum involves higher rst-period consumption
for agents who like e¤ort than for those who dislike e¤ort, since their CCPERLE
exhibits a higher marginal rise when rst-period consumption increases. More-
over, whether patient agents receive more or less consumption in the rst period
that impatient agents depends on the level of survival probabilities. If survival
chances are low (whatever the e¤ort is), the most relevant group consists of
short-lived individuals. Hence, given that the more reactive CCPERLE among
the short-lived are those of patient agents, these should receive higher rst-
period consumption. On the contrary, if survival chances are high (whatever
the e¤ort is), the most relevant group consists of survivors. Then, the most re-
active CCPERLE is the one of impatient agents, who should then receive higher
consumption at the young age.
The social optimum also involves declining consumption proles. Regarding
the levels of second-period consumption, these all exceed c, and the largest old-
age consumption concerns patient agents who like e¤orts, whereas the lowest
old-age consumption is for impatient agents who dislike e¤ort.
Finally, the social optimum involves a positive prevention e¤ort for all indi-
viduals, even though agents who like e¤orts should still, at the social optimum,
make more e¤orts than e¤ort-averse agents.
We are now in position to compare the social optimum under the Sum of
Transformed CCPERLE with the one under the Maximin CCPERLE.
Corollary 1 Comparing the social optima under Maximin CCPERLE () and
under the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE (), we have:
c1j < c

2j but
(
c1j < c

2j when low  ()
c1j > c

2j when high  ()
ci1 < c

i2 and c

i1 < c

i2
d11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 < d

11 < d

12; d

21 < d

22
e11 = e

21 = 0 < e

11 = e

21
e12 = e

22 = e = e

12 = e

22
Proof. The proof follows from Propositions 1 and 2.
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There are three major di¤erences between those alternative social optima.
First, in terms of prevention, whereas the Maximin CCPERLE recommends
no preventive e¤ort for agents who dislike these, on the grounds of the welfare
of those who turn out to be short-lived despite e¤orts, the Sum of Transformed
CCPERLE legitimates prevention e¤orts for all, but with, nonetheless, lower
e¤orts for those who dislike e¤orts. That major di¤erence is due to the fact that
the latter social objective, takes - unlike the former - the number of survivors
into account, and not only the welfare of the short-lived.
Second, whereas the Maximin CCPERLE assigns a low consumption c to all
surviving old individuals, the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE provides higher
old-age consumption to all survivors, while favouring the patient over the im-
patient, and e¤ort-lover over e¤ort-averse agents. This major departure with
respect to the Maximin CCPERLE optimum comes from the aggregated nature
of the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE objective, which cares also about the
welfare of the old individuals, even though these are not the worst-o¤s.
Third, there is also some major di¤erence regarding the treatment of het-
erogeneity at the young age. The Maximin CCPERLE favours patient agents
(for whom the welfare loss due to premature death is the largest). On the con-
trary, the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE favours, for su¢ ciently large survival
chances, impatient agents over patient agents, since, in case of widespread sur-
vival to the old age, the CCPERLE of impatient agents is more reactive to cij
than the one of patient agents. Finally, both the Maximin CCPERLE and the
Sum of Transformed CCPERLE favour agents who like e¤ort (since e¤ort-averse
are supposed to benet from a lower e¤ort than the reference level, which makes
their CCPERLE less reactive to a marginal rise in cij).
The Sum of Transformed CCPERLE, by leading to a higher prevention and
to a higher level of consumption at the old age, seems less radical than the
Maximin CCPERLE. Nonetheless, that social objective faces a major inconve-
nient: more prevention and more old-age consumption both go against the ideal
of compensating short-lived individuals. Thus that alternative social objective
does not overcome the dilemma between compensation and prevention. It only
provides one approach, which gives up the priority to compensation. Obviously,
giving up that priority is not costless.
6 Extensions
6.1 Unobserved ex ante heterogeneity
Let us now relax the perfect observability assumption on preference parameters
i and j , and characterize the second-best social optimum, under the Maximin
CCPERLE and the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE.
Focusing on the former social objective, the problem of the social plan-
ner is, under that alternative information environment, to propose 4 bundles
(cij ; dij ; eij), one for each ex ante type, in such a way as to maximize the mini-
mum CCPERLE, still subject to the budget constraint, to which we add incen-
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tive compatibility constraints. Given that, at the rst-best, impatient agents
may be tempted to pretend to be patient, to receive higher rst-period con-
sumption, and that e¤ort-averse agents may also be tempted to pretend to be
e¤ort-lover, the incentive compatibility constraints are:
u(c1j) + jv (e1j) +  (e1j)1u(d1j)  u(c2j) + jv (e2j) +  (e2j)1u(d2j) 8j = 1; 2
u(ci1) + 1v (ei1) +  (ei1)iu(di1)  u(ci2) + 1v (ei2) +  (ei2)iu(di2) 8i = 1; 2
The solution to that social planning problem is represented below.
Proposition 3 Under imperfect information about ex-ante types
 
i; j

, and
(4 + 2~ + 2) c W , the Maximin CCPERLE optimum involves:
c < c11 = c

21 < c

12 = c

22
d11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 = c
e11 = e

21 = 0 < e

12 = e

22 = e
Proof. See the Appendix.
The only di¤erence with respect to the rst-best is that patient and impatient
agents are here treated equally at the young age, unlike at the rst-best, where
patient agents received higher rst-period consumptions. Note, however, that it
remains still true that e¤ort-loving agents receive more rst-period consumption
than e¤ort-averse agents, exactly as in the rst-best. The reason is that, when
the social planner o¤ers a bundle with maximum prevention, all e¤ort-averse
agents are forced to reveal their true type, to avoid large welfare losses. Thus
the rst-best inequalities between e¤ort-averse and e¤ort-lover consumption at
the young age are, at least qualitatively, conserved at the second-best.
Turning now to the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE, the addition, to the
social planners problem, of incentive compatibility constraints tends to compli-
cate the analysis. However, the extent to which the second-best optimum di¤ers
from the rst-best optimum can be illustrated numerically. For that purpose,
the following table compares the rst-best and second-best optima under three
degrees of inequality aversion:  = 0:5,  = 2 and  = 5.22
First-best gures perfectly illustrate the results in Proposition 2. E¤ort-
averse agents always receive, ceteris paribus, lower consumption than e¤ort-
loving agents (both at the young and the old age). Moreover, patient agents
have higher old-age consumption than impatient agents. However, at the young
age, impatient agents receive higher consumption than patient agents when
optimal prevention is high, i.e. under  = 0:50, whereas the opposite holds
under lower prevention, as under  = 2 and  = 5. Regarding prevention, it
is optimal for e¤ort-loving agents to carry out maximum prevention e, while
22Here we assume u(cij) = 2
p
cij , v(eij) =
e2ij
2
, and  (eij) =
a+7e
b+7e
as well as the following
values for our parameters:
1 2 1 2 e a b W `
 e
0.5 1.0 -1 1 1 2 3 100 2 1
21
e¤ort-averse agents only do prevention when inequality aversion is su¢ ciently
low.
 = 0:5  = 2:0  = 5:0
FB SB FB SB FB SB
c11 27.60 25.70 18.60 21.90 16.90 22.20
c12 29.10 27.20 23.20 25.30 21.10 26.50
c21 15.40 17.10 23.60 21.30 27.10 22.20
c22 16.40 18.00 28.40 25.30 32.30 26.50
d11 2.00 1.50 1.10 2.10 0.60 1.00
d12 2.00 1.50 1.10 1.70 0.60 0.70
d21 4.50 5.40 2.80 2.70 1.00 1.10
d22 4.60 5.40 2.80 1.70 1.10 0.70
e11 0.52 0.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
e12 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
e21 0.49 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
e22 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Turning now to the second-best, the added incentive constraints have the
following e¤ects. In order to prevent impatient agents from pretending to be
patient, a simple solution consists of proposing consumption bundles with higher
second-period consumption for agents who pretend to be patient, in comparison
with the rst-best. That upward distortion in old-age consumption is observed
under low inequality aversion (i.e.  = 0:5). However, for higher degrees of
inequality aversion, the separation of types is no longer achieved through larger
old-age consumption gap between patient and impatient agents, but, rather,
through proposing higher rst-period consumptions for the impatient, as well
as lower rst-period consumption for the patient, in comparison to the rst-best.
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Figure 1: CCPERLE at FB and SB
( = 0:5).
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Figure 2: CCPERLE at FB and SB
( = 5:00).
As far as welfare inequalities are concerned, the comparison of CCPERLE
levels shown on Figures 1 and 2 conrms that welfare inequalities between short-
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lived and long-lived agents are signicantly reduced when the inequality aversion
rises from  = 0:5 (Figure 1) to  = 5 (Figure 2), in the rst-best as well as
the second-best optimum. Under low inequality aversion (Figure 1), impatient
agents are, at the rst-best, better o¤ than patient agents, and e¤ort-averse
individuals are better o¤ than e¤ort-loving agents ceteris paribus. These in-
equalities are preserved at the second-best optimum. The only di¤erence is that
impatient agents are net "losers" at the second-best (in comparison with the
rst-best), whereas patient agents are net "winners". In contrast, under high
inequality aversion (Figure 2), the rst-best involves lower inequalities across
ex ante types, for short-lived as well as long-lived agents. Nonetheless, at the
second-best, the "winners"  in comparison to the rst-best  are now the
impatient individuals, and the "losers" are the patient ones. This is an inver-
sion of what is observed under low inequality aversion. Hence, the impact of
incentive compatibility constraints in terms of welfare inequalities is sensitive
to the degree of inequality aversion.
6.2 Reference longevity and e¤ort
Let us now assess the robustness of our results to the reference levels for longevity
` and prevention e. For that purpose, we rst take the minimum longevity ` = 1
as the reference longevity `, while still assuming reference e¤ort e = e. The
following table shows the CCPERLE for the 8 types of agents ex post.
  ` def. CCPERLE c^ij`
1 1 1 u (c^111) + 1v(e) = u (c11) + 1v(e11)
1 2 1 u (c^121) + 2v(e) = u (c12) + 2v(e12)
2 1 1 u (c^211) + 1v(e) = u (c21) + 1v(e21)
2 2 1 u (c^221) + 2v(e) = u (c22) + 2v(e22)
1 1 2 u (c^112) + 1v(e) = u (c11) + 1v(e11) + 1u (d11)
1 2 2 u (c^122) + 2v(e) = u (c12) + 2v(e12) + 1u (d12)
2 1 2 u (c^212) + 1v(e) = u (c21) + 1v(e21) + 2u (d21)
2 2 2 u (c^222) + 2v(e) = u (c22) + 2v(e22) + 2u (d22)
The problem of the social planner can thus be written as follows:
max
cij ;dij ;eij
min(c^111;c^121;c^211;c^221;c^112;c^122;c^212;c^222) s.t. BC
where the CCPERLE c^ij` are dened in the above table.
Proposition 4 Under perfect information about ex-ante types
 
i; j

, and
(4 + 2~ + 2) c W , the Maximin CCPERLE optimum involves, under ` = 1:
c < c11 = c

21 < c

22 = c

12
d11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 = c
e11 = e

21 = 0 < e

12 = e

22 = e
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The only di¤erence with respect to the Maximin CCPERLE under ` =
2 concerns the treatment of patient and impatient agents at the young age.
Whereas, under ` = 2, patient agents receive higher consumption at young
age, this is no longer true under ` = 1, where they are treated equally, because
the short-liveds CCPERLE is independent from time preferences under ` = 1.
Note also that the second-best Maximin CCPERLE, at which patient and
impatient agents have the same rst-period consumption, is fully robust to the
selection of the reference longevity level (unlike the rst-best optimum).
Take now the case where the reference e¤ort level is the minimum e¤ort
level: e = 0. The list of CCPERLE becomes, under ` = 2:
  ` def. CCPERLE c^ij`
1 1 1 u (c^111) (1 + 1) = u (c11) + 1v(e11)
1 2 1 u (c^121) (1 + 1) = u (c12) + 2v(e12)
2 1 1 u (c^211) (1 + 2) = u (c21) + 1v(e21)
2 2 1 u (c^221) (1 + 2) = u (c22) + 2v(e22)
1 1 2 u (c^112) (1 + 1) = u (c11) + 1v(e11) + 1u (d11)
1 2 2 u (c^122) (1 + 1) = u (c12) + 2v(e12) + 1u (d12)
2 1 2 u (c^212) (1 + 2) = u (c21) + 1v(e21) + 2u (d21)
2 2 2 u (c^222) (1 + 2) = u (c22) + 2v(e22) + 2u (d22)
The problem of the social planner can thus be written as follows:
max
cij ;dij ;eij
min(c^111;c^121;c^211;c^221;c^112;c^122;c^212;c^222) s.t. BC
where the CCPERLE c^ij` are dened in the above table.
Proposition 5 Under perfect information about ex-ante types
 
i; j

, and
(4 + 2~ + 2) c W , the Maximin CCPERLE optimum involves, under e = 0:
c < c12 < c

11; c

22 < c

21
d11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 = c
e11 = e

21 = 0 < e

12 = e

22 = e
Proof. See the Appendix.
There is a unique di¤erence with respect to the baseline case where e = e:
here e¤ort-averse agents receive, at the young age, a higher consumption than
e¤ort-loving agents, instead of a lower consumption. The same di¤erence holds
with respect to the second-best Maximin CCPERLE, at which e¤ort-loving
agents have, under e = e, a higher rst-period consumption than e¤ort-averse
agents.
Turning now to the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE, the social planners
problem can still be rewritten, when we consider that ` = 1 and e = e, as:
max
cij ;dij ;eij
X
i;j
nij1hij1 (cij ; eij) +
X
i;j
nij2hij2(cij ; dij ; eij) s.t. BC
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where hij1(cij ; eij)  gfij1 (cij ; eij) and hij2(cij ; dij;eij)  gfij2 (cij ; dij ; eij),
with fij1 (cij ; eij)  f
 
U1ij   jv(e)

and fij2 (cij ; dij ; eij)  f
 
U2ij   jv(e)

.
Proposition 6 Under perfect information about ex-ante types
 
i; j

, and
(4 + 4) c  W , the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE optimum involves, un-
der ` = 1:
ci1 < c

i2 8i(
c1j < c

2j when low  ()
c1j > c

2j when high  ()
cij > d

ij 8i; j
d22 > d

12; d

21 > d

11 > c
e12 = e

22 = e > e

21 > e

11 > 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
Thus the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE social optimum looks, from a
qualitative perspective, quite robust to the selected reference longevity.
Turning now to the alternative case where ` = 2 and e = 0, the social
planner problem becomes:
max
cij ;dij ;eij
X
i;j
nij1hij1 (cij ; eij) +
X
i;j
nij2hij2(cij ; dij ; eij) s.t. BC
where hij1(cij ; eij)  gfij1 (cij ; eij) and hij2(cij ; dij;eij)  gfij2 (cij ; dij ; eij),
with fij1 (cij ; eij)  f

U1ij
1+i

and fij2 (cij ; dij ; eij)  f

U2ij
1+i

.
Proposition 7 Under perfect information about ex-ante types
 
i; j

, and
(4 + 4) c  W , the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE optimum involves, un-
der e = 0:
ci1 > c

i2 8i(
c1j < c

2j when low  ()
c1j > c

2j when high  ()
cij > d

ij 8i; j
d22 > d

12; d

21 > d

11 > c
e12 = e

22 = e > e

21 > e

11 > 0
Proof. See the Appendix.
The Sum of Transformed CCPERLE optimum involves here higher rst-
period consumptions for the e¤ort-averse agents in comparison to the e¤ort-
loving agents, contrary to what prevails when the reference e¤ort is the max-
imum e¤ort. The reason is that the change in the reference e¤ort makes the
marginal change in CCPERLE of short-lived e¤ort-averse agents larger, ceteris
paribus, than the one of short-lived e¤ort-loving agents.
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In sum, although some changes may arise in terms of rst-period consump-
tion di¤erentials across di¤erent ex ante types, both the Maximin CCPERLE
and the Sum of Transformed CCPERLE are quite robust to changes in the
reference levels of longevity and prevention e¤ort.
7 Conclusions
Common sense supports prevention policies aimed at improving survival chances.
But it is also widely acknowledged that a premature death is a serious disadvan-
tage, which raises strong compensation concerns. Thus postponing death and
making death benign constitute two reasonable attitudes in front of death.
Although both intuitive, those attitudes are logically incompatible. Indeed,
we showed, by means of a simple model of risky lifetime with heterogeneous
attitudes towards the future and towards prevention, that no social ordering on
allocations can satisfy both a concern for prevention and a concern for com-
pensation. The reason is that, if it is socially desirable to increase the number
of survivors through prevention, it must also be, under costly prevention, de-
sirable to deteriorate the living standards of the short-lived, which contradicts
compensation. Hence a dilemma exists between prevention and compensation.
We proposed here two alternative approaches to that dilemma: either giving
priority to compensation (i.e. Maximin CCPERLE), or giving up that priority,
and favouring prevention (Sum of Transformed CCPERLE). We showed that
the former social objective leads us to restrict prevention only to individuals
who like it  whatever its e¤ects on survival chances are  while e¤ort-averse
individuals should be left free to do no prevention. On the contrary, the lat-
ter objective, while still leading to a di¤erentiated prevention on the basis of
individual preferences, generally supports prevention for all.
Each of these two approaches to the compensation / prevention dilemma
su¤ers from its own weaknesses. On the one hand, priority to compensation
can only be achieved at the cost of worse survival chances. On the other hand,
giving up priority to compensation will favour the survival of a larger number
of individuals, but at the cost of even worse living standards for the unlucky
short-lived. In any case, the dilemma remains, and, in that context, the optimal
policy should be regarded not as the "best" policy, but, rather, as the "least
bad" way to deal with that inevitable dilemma.
The goal of this paper is not to argue against prevention policies. From
a historical perspective, prevention has played a major role in the secular im-
provement of survival conditions (see Easterlin 1999), and it is still, nowadays, a
major instrument for the improvement of aggregate longevity outcomes. What
we want to highlight here is rather that massive prevention, by trying to post-
pone death for all, can, for some persons, make premature death even more
damageable than it would have been without prevention. It follows from this
that a dilemma between prevention and compensation exists, and cannot be
avoided. How a society deals with this dilemma is a matter of social choice.
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9 Appendix
9.1 Proof of Theorem 3
Weak Pareto and Continuity imply that Strong Pareto is also satised.
By Pareto Indi¤erence, it is enough to have a ranking of all allocations in
which for all i; longevity is at the reference and consumption is constant. This
ranking is then extended to all allocations in a unique way.
By Strong Pareto, Continuity, and Separability, and the Debreu-Gorman
theorem, for every RN there is an increasing 'iRN ; for every i; such that
xN %RN x0N i¤
P
i2N 'iRN (c^N ) 
P
i2N 'iRN (c^
0
N ) : By PDCCREL, 'iRN
must be concave and one can take the same 'RN for every i:
Hansson Independence and Separability entail a stronger form of Separabil-
ity:
Axiom 8 (Strong Separability) For all RN ; R0N 2 <jN j, all xN , x0N 2 X jN j,
all M  N , 
xM ; xNnM

%(RM ;RNnM)
 
x0M ; xNnM
, xM ; x0NnM %RM ;R0NnM x0M ; x0NnM :
This implication is shown by considering R00NnM ; R
000
NnM and x
00
NnM such that
indi¤erence curves for
 
xNnM ; RNnM

coincide with those of

xNnM ; R00NnM

;
those of

x0NnM ; R
0
NnM

coincide with those of

x0NnM ; R
000
NnM

; and those of
x00NnM ; R
00
NnM

coincide with those of

x00NnM ; R
000
NnM

: (This is done by taking
a high x00NnM . Combining Hansson Independence and Separability, one gets 
xM ; xNnM

% (RM ;RNnM)
 
x0M ; xNnM
,  xM ; xNnM %RM ;R00NnM  x0M ; xNnM
,

xM ; x
00
NnM

%
RM ;R00NnM
 x0M ; x00NnM
,

xM ; x
00
NnM

%
RM ;R0NnM
 x0M ; x00NnM
,

xM ; x
0
NnM

%
RM ;R0NnM
 x0M ; x0NnM :
This Strong Separability axiom implies that one can take the same ' for
all RN (because it implies that 'RN does not depend on RNnM for all M). It
is then straightforward to check that
P
i2N ' (c^N ) satises Survivors Numbers
Count.
9.2 Proof of Proposition 1
To nd the bundles maximizing the minimum CCPERLE, we rst need to iden-
tify the worst-o¤ agents. We can rst note that, if u(dij) > 0, the short-lived
individuals are worse-o¤ than the long-lived individuals with the same ex ante
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characteristics. Alternatively, if u(dij) < 0, the short-lived are better-o¤ than
the long-lived individuals, ceteris paribus. Hence the perfect equality of lifetime
welfare across individuals with the same ex ante characteristics involves:23
d11 = d

21 = d

12 = d

22 = c
Moreover, it appears also clearly from the table that the CCPERLE of all short-
lived agents can be raised by imposing the minimum level of e¤ort to those who
do not like e¤ort, and the maximum level of e¤ort to those who like it:
e11 = e

21 = 0 < e

12 = e

22 = e
Hence, three cases can arise, depending on the level of endowment W .
 If (4 + 2~ + 2) c W , the optimum involves:
d11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 = c
c11; c

12; c

21; c

22 > c
 If (2~ + 2) c W  (4 + 2~ + 2) c, the optimum involves:
d11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 = c
c11; c

12; c

21; c

22  c
 If W  (2~ + 2) c, the optimum involves:
d11 < c

11 < c and d

12 < c

12 < c
d21 < c

21 < c and d

22 < c

22 < c
In rich economies, the worst-o¤s are the short-lived, and compensation re-
quires welfare-neutral consumption at the old age, while the young enjoy many
more resources. In a poor economy, it is rather the opposite: the long-lived are
the worst-o¤s, and compensation requires to give to the long-lived the welfare-
neutral consumption, and less to the young.
Let us now focus on consumption at the young age. If one compares then
short-lived agents of type-i1 with short-lived agents of type-i2, it is clear that,
given ei1 = 0 < ei2 = e, short-lived type-i1 have always a higher CCPERLE
than short-lived type-i2 when rst-period consumptions are equalized.24 Fur-
thermore, if one compares two agents with an equal j but di¤erent i, it
23That strategy is actually quite similar to what used to prevail in the absence of health-
a¤ecting e¤ort (see Fleurbaey et al 2011).
24To see this, focus on the rst two types. After simplication for e¤ort levels, we have:
u (c^111) (1 + 1) + 1 [v(e)  v(e11)] = u (c11)
u (c^121) (1 + 1) = u (c12)
Given that 1 [v(e)  v(e11)] < 0, it follows that c^111 > c^121 for an equal consumption level.
Focusing on the next two types, we have:
u (c^211) (1 + 2) + 1 [v(e)  v(e21)] = u (c21)
u (c^221) (1 + 2) = u (c22)
yielding here again c^211 > c^221 under equal consumptions.
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appears that type-2j agents have a lower CCPERLE than type-1j agents for
the same level of e¤ort. Hence the worst-o¤ agents who should benet from
priority are clearly type-22 agents, who are patient and like e¤ort. Actually,
under equal rst-period consumptions, we would have:
c^221 < c^121 < c^111 and c^221 < c^211 < c^111 and c^121 ? c^211
Therefore, the equalization of the CCPERLE among the short-lived requires:
c11 < c

12 < c

22 and c

11 < c

21 < c

22 and c

12 ? c21
Hence, rst-period consumption is the largest for patient agents who like
e¤orts (i.e. c22), and the smallest for impatient agents who do not like e¤orts
(i.e. c11). For an equal j , the patient receive a higher rst-period consumption
than the impatient, whereas, for equal i, the agents who like e¤ort receive a
higher rst-period consumption than those who dislike e¤ort. However, once we
start comparing agents di¤ering in both patience and attitude towards e¤ort,
no obvious ranking of CCPERLE can be found.25
Let us now compute the CCPERLE ranking at the optimum. Here again,
several cases can arise.
 If (4 + 2~ + 2) c W , the optimum involves:
d11 = d

12 = d

21 = d

22 = c
c < c11 < c

12 < c

22 and c

11 < c

21 < c

22 and c

12 ? c21
From which we may obtain a perfect equalization of CCPERLE levels:
c^111 = c^121 = c^211 = c^221 = c^112 = c^122 = c^212 = c^222
or keeping some inequalities may remain across ex ante types (when the
welfare gap due to di¤erent e¤orts cannot be compensated by unequal
consumptions at the young age):
c^121 = c^122  c^111 = c^112 and c^221 = c^222  c^211 = c^212
c^211 = c^212  c^111 = c^112 and c^221 = c^222  c^121 = c^122
 If (2~ + 2) c  W  (4 + 2~ + 2) c, the optimum involves also a per-
fect equalization of CCPERLE between individuals with the same ex ante
characteristics, but some inequalities may remain across ex ante types:
c^121 = c^122  c^111 = c^112 and c^221 = c^222  c^211 = c^212
c^211 = c^212  c^111 = c^112 and c^221 = c^222  c^121 = c^122
25The reason is that patient agents who dislike e¤ort may make more or less e¤ort than
impatient agents who like e¤ort, so that the optimal consumptions c12 and c

21 cannot be
ranked, but are necessarily between c11 and c

22.
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 If W  (2~ + 2) c, the optimum involves inequalities between short-lived
and long-lived within a given ex ante type, and may also involve other
inequalities across ex ante types:
c^122 < c^121  c^112 < c^111 and c^222 < c^221  c^212 < c^211
c^212 < c^211  c^112 < c^111 and c^222 < c^221  c^122 < c^121
Thus, the introduction of health-a¤ecting e¤orts may prevent the perfect
equalization of lifetime welfare across all individuals, even when a full com-
pensation for unequal longevities can be provided. The reason is that welfare
inequalities at the young age depend strongly on the shape of the disutility of
e¤ort v(e) in comparison with the shape of the utility of consumption u(c).26
9.3 Properties of the CCPERLE
Let us check the relative relevance of Cases A and B by taking a simple analytical
example, with:
U1ij = (cij)
 + j
(eij)
2
2
; U2ij = (cij)
 + j
(eij)
2
2
+ i(dij)
;
where 0 <  < 1. In that case, the (des)utility of e¤ort is quadratic.
Hence the CCPERLE is here:
c^ij` =
 
U `ij   j (e)
2
2
1 + i
! 1

Thus we have:
c^ij1 =
 
(cij)

+ j
(eij)
2
2   j (e)
2
2
1 + i
! 1

, c^ij2 =
 
(cij)

+ i(dij)
 + j
(eij)
2
2   j (e)
2
2
1 + i
! 1

Hence the derivatives of the untransformed CCPERLE are here:
@c^i11
@ci1
> 0;
@c^i21
@ci2
> 0;
@c^2i11
@c2i1
< 0;
@c^2i21
@c2i2
= 0
@c^i12
@ci1
> 0;
@c^i22
@ci2
> 0;
@c^2i12
@c2i1
< 0;
@c^2i22
@c2i2
< 0
@c^i12
@di1
> 0;
@c^i22
@di2
> 0;
@c^2i12
@d2i1
< 0;
@c^2i22
@d2i2
< 0
@c^i11
@ei1
< 0;
@c^i21
@ei2
> 0;
@c^2i11
@e2i1
7 0; @c^
2
i21
@e2i2
> 0
@c^i12
@ei1
< 0;
@c^i22
@ei2
> 0;
@c^2i12
@e2i1
7 0; @c^
2
i22
@e2i2
> 0
26 If u(c) is too concave, increasing the consumption of those who hate e¤ort may not allow
a full compensation of disutility from e¤orts, and so some welfare inequality may remain
between ex ante types.
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9.4 Proof of Proposition 2
Dening  as the Lagrange multiplier associated with the resource constraint of
the economy, the rst-order conditions of the social planners problem yield:
(1  (e11))
@h111 ()
@c11
+ (e11)
@h112()
@c11
=  =
@h112()
@d11
(1  (e12))
@h121 ()
@c12
+ (e12)
@h122()
@c12
=  =
@h122()
@d12
(1  (e21))
@h211 ()
@c21
+ (e21)
@h212()
@c21
=  =
@h212()
@d21
(1  (e22))
@h221 ()
@c22
+ (e22)
@h222()
@c22
=  =
@h222()
@d22
0(e11)

h112 ()  h111 ()  @h112 ()
@d11
d11

=  

(1  (e11))
@h111 ()
@e11
+ (e11)
@h112 ()
@e11

> 0
0(e12)

h122 ()  h121 ()  @h122 ()
@d12
d12

=  

(1  (e12))
@h121 ()
@e12
+ (e12)
@h122 ()
@e12

< 0
0(e21)

h212 ()  h211 ()  @h212 ()
@d21
d21

=  

(1  (e21))
@h211 ()
@e21
+ (e21)
@h212 ()
@e21

> 0
0(e22)

h222 ()  h221 ()  @h222 ()
@d22
d22

=  

(1  (e22))
@h221 ()
@e22
+ (e22)
@h222 ()
@e22

< 0
Assuming that resources are su¢ cient to make survival desirable (i.e. (4 + 4) c 
W ), the LHS of the FOCs for optimal prevention is necessarily positive, im-
plying that the second and fourth FOC are not be satised: in the case of
e¤ort-loving agents, the socially optimal e¤ort level is a corner solution, equal
to the maximum e¤ort: e12 = e

22 = e. Moreover, given that the net gain,
in terms of the transformed CCPERLE, associated with survival is, in general,
higher for patient agents than impatient agents (so that the factor in brackets
in the LHS is larger for patient agents), whereas the welfare cost of e¤ort is
the same, we expect, assuming an interior social optimum, it is optimal that
2-type agents make more e¤orts, ceteris paribus, than 1-type agents. Hence
we obtain: e12 = e

22 = e > e

21 > e

11 > 0.
Let us now combine, for a given type ij, the FOCs for optimal consump-
tion at the young age and at the old age: @hij1()@cij   (e

ij )
@hij1()
@cij
=
@hij2()
@dij
 
(eij )
@hij2()
@cij
. Given that h  g  f

U`ij jv(e)
1+i

is concave, we have that
@hij1()
@cij
>
@hij2()
@cij
ceteris paribus. Hence, the equality requires @hij1()@cij >
@hij2()
@dij
,
that is, the e¤ect, on the transformed CCPERLE of a short-lived agent, of a
marginal rise in cij must, at the optimum, exceed the e¤ect, on the transformed
equivalent for a long-lived agent, of a marginal rise in dij . Such an inequality
rules out, given the concavity of u(), cases where dij is too low. Hence we have:
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dij > c.
27
Note also that: @hij1()@cij + (e

ij )
h
@hij2()
@cij
  @hij1()@cij
i
=
@hij2()
@dij
. Hence, given
that @hij2()@cij  
@hij1()
@cij
< 0, it follows that: @hij1()@cij >
@hij2()
@dij
, implying cij > d

ij ,
that is, declining consumption proles along the lifecycle.
Regarding second-period consumption, we also have: @h112()@d11 =
@h122()
@d12
=
@h212()
@d21
= @h222()@d22 . Here again, given the concavity of h(), and given that
patient agents have, ceteris paribus, a higher marginal gain from second-period
consumption, we expect d2j > d

1j . The same is true, at the optimum, for e¤ort-
loving agents, so that we expect di2 > d

i1 . Hence we have: d

22 > d

12; d

21 >
d11 > c.
Let us now compare rst-period consumption levels. We have: @h111()@c11 +
(e11)
h
@h112()
@c11
  @h111()@c11
i
= @h211()@c21 + (e

21)
h
@h212()
@c21
  @h211()@c21
i
. Given the
concavity of h(), the e¤ect, on the transformed CCPERLE, of a rise in rst-
period consumption in case of premature death is larger for 2-type agents than
for 1-type agents. Hence
@h111()
@c11
< @h211()@c21 . Note that the marginal e¤ect,
on the transformed CCPERLE, of a rise in cij is always larger for short-lived
than for long-lived. Thus, the second terms of the LHS and RHS are negative.
Moreover, given d21 > d

11, the e¤ect, on the transformed CCPERLE, of a
rise in rst-period consumption in case of long life is larger for 1-type agents
than for 2-type agents:
@h112()
@c11
> @h212()@c21 . Thus the rst term of the RHS
exceeds the rst term of the LHS ceteris paribus, and, in absolute value, the
factor in brackets of the LHS is larger than the one of the RHS. Note that, as
e11 < e

21, more weight is assigned to the (negative) second term of the RHS
than to the (negative) second term on the LHS. Thus the result depends on how
large survival chances are.
 If low survival chances, i.e. a low  () for all e¤ort levels, we have: c21 >
c11, on the grounds of the larger welfare loss due to a shorter life in case
of patient agents, even though that loss is less likely than for impatient
agents, who make less e¤ort.
 If high survival chances, i.e. a high  () for all e¤ort levels, then we have:
c21 < c

11, on the grounds of the more likely welfare loss for impatient
agents, as these make less e¤ort, even though that loss is less sizeable
than for patient agents.
Regarding other rst-period consumption levels, we have:
@h111()
@c11
+ (e11)
h
@h112()
@c11
  @h111()@c11
i
= @h121()@c12 + (e

12)
h
@h122()
@c12
  @h121()@c12
i
27 Indeed, if dij was lower than c, we would get:
@hij1 ()
@cij
<
@hij2()
@dij

dij=c
hence contradicting the above FOC.
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In case of short life, the marginal gain from rst period consumption is
larger for agents who have, ceteris paribus, the lowest CCPERLE, i.e. agents
who like e¤ort. Hence @h111()@c11 <
@h121()
@c12
ceteris paribus. In case of long-lived
agents, we also have @h112()@c11 <
@h122()
@c12
. However, given that the marginal e¤ect,
on the transformed CCPERLE, of a rise in cij is always larger for short-lived
than for long-lived, the terms in brackets are negative. Note, however, that, as
@h111()
@c11
< @h121()@c12 and
@h112()
@c11
< @h122()@c12 , the two factors in brackets are likely
to be very close to each others. Hence, the rst terms will drive the optimal
allocation of resources at the young age. Given @h111()@c11 <
@h121()
@c12
, we obtain
that: c11 < c

12, since short-lived agents who like e¤ort have larger marginal
welfare gains from more consumption, in comparison to e¤ort-averse agents.
Following a similar rationale, we obtain also: c21 < c

22.
9.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Equal old-age consumption is trivially incentive compatible, as it will not induce
any mimicking behavior. Let us now show that unequal consumption for patient
and impatient agents at the young age is not incentive compatible. Incentive
compatibility requires:
u(c1j)+jv (e1j)+ (e1j)1u(d1j)  u(c2j)+jv (e2j)+ (e2j)1u(d2j) 8j = 1; 2
Hence, if, like at the rst-best, dij = c for all, as well as e1i = e2i, and if
c1j < c2j , we obtain that the rst term of the LHS is smaller than the rst
term of the RHS, while the second and third terms of the LHS are exactly
equal to the ones of the RHS. Hence, incentive compatibility is not satised.
Impatient agents have thus an incentive to lie on their type. To avoid this, the
unique solution is to equalize rst-period consumption for patient and impatient
agents: c1j = c2j .
Turning now to the second incentive compatibility constraint, i.e.
u(ci1)+1v (ei1)+ (ei1)iu(di1)  u(ci2)+1v (ei2)+ (ei2)iu(di2) 8i = 1; 2
we see that, if, like in the rst-best, we propose dij = c, as well as ci1 < ci2 and
ei1 = 0 < ei2 = e, we have:
u(ci1)  u(ci2) + 1v (e) 8i = 1; 2
The LHS is smaller than the rst-term of the RHS, and the second term of the
RHS is negative. Hence, given that 1v (e) is far below 0, we have, in general,
that the rst-best inequality ci1 < c

i2 is incentive compatible.
9.6 Proof of Proposition 4
Changing the reference longevity level from ` = 2 to ` = 1 does not change
the optimal level of second-period consumptions. Indeed, in order to obtain an
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equalization of lifetime welfare between long-lived and short-lived of a given ex
ante type, it is necessary, when resources are su¢ ciently large (i.e. (4 + 2~ + 2) c 
W ), to x dij = c 8i; j. Moreover, regarding optimal prevention, we still ob-
tain that e¤ort-lovers should do the maximum, i.e. ei2 = e, while e¤ort-averse
agents should do the minimum: ei1 = 0. The only di¤erence concerns rst-
period consumption. When comparing the CCPERLE of short-lived patient
and impatient agents, we see that it is now independent from time preferences.
This implies equal rst-period consumption for patient and impatient agents:
c1j = c

2j . On the contrary, e¤ort-loving agents still receive a higher rst-period
consumption, since their CCPERLE is lower than the one of e¤ort-averse agents,
ceteris paribus. This implies: ci1 < c

i2.
9.7 Proof of Proposition 5
Changing the reference e¤ort level from e = e to e = 0 does not change the
optimal level of second-period consumptions.28 Moreover, regarding optimal
prevention, we still obtain that e¤ort-lovers should do the maximum, i.e. ei2 = e,
while e¤ort-averse agents should do the minimum: ei1 = 0. The only di¤erence
concerns rst-period consumption. When comparing the CCPERLE of short-
lived e¤ort-averse and e¤ort-loving agents, we see that the CCPERLE of the
former is always smaller than the CCPERLE of the latter. This implies higher
rst-period consumption for e¤ort-averse than for e¤ort-loving agents ceteris
paribus: ci1 > c

i2. Note that the CCPERLE of short-lived patient agents is still
lower than the one of short-lived impatient agents, which implies: c1j < c

2j .
9.8 Proof of Proposition 6
The FOCs of the social planners problem are similar to the ones under the
di¤erent denition of the CCPERLE. The di¤erence is that, in the present con-
text, hij1(cij ; eij)  g  fij1 (cij ; eij) and hij2(cij ; dij;eij)  g  fij2 (cij ; dij ; eij),
where f
 
U1ij   jv(e)
  fij1 (cij ; eij) and f  U2ij   jv(e)  fij2 (cij ; dij ; eij).
From the last four FOCs, we obtain, as above: e12 = e

22 = e > e

21 > e

11 >
0.
Let us now combine, for a given type ij, the FOCs for optimal consump-
tion at the young age and at the old age: @hij1()@cij   (e

ij )
@hij1()
@cij
=
@hij2()
@dij
 
(eij )
@hij2()
@cij
. Given that h  g  f  U `ij   jv(e) is concave, we have that
@hij1()
@cij
>
@hij2()
@cij
ceteris paribus. Hence, the equality requires @hij1()@cij >
@hij2()
@dij
.
Such an inequality rules out, given the concavity of u(), cases where dij is too
low.29 We thus have: dij > c. Note also that
@hij1()
@cij
+(eij )
h
@hij2()
@cij
  @hij1()@cij
i
=
@hij2()
@dij
. Hence, given that @hij2()@cij  
@hij1()
@cij
< 0, it follows that: @hij1()@cij >
28 Indeed, in order to obtain an equalization of lifetime welfare between long-lived and
short-lived of a given ex ante type, it is necessary, when resources are su¢ ciently large (i.e.
(4 + 2~ + 2) c W ), to x dij = c 8i; j.
29By the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2.
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@hij2()
@dij
, implying cij > d

ij , that is, declining consumption proles along the
lifecycle.
Regarding second-period consumption, we also have: @h112()@d11 =
@h122()
@d12
=
@h212()
@d21
= @h222()@d22 . Given the concavity of h(), and given that patient agents
have, ceteris paribus, a higher marginal gain from second-period consumption,
we have d2j > d

1j . The same is true, at the optimum, for e¤ort-loving agents,
so that we expect di2 > d

i1 . Hence we have: d

22 > d

12; d

21 > d

11 > c.
Let us now compare rst-period consumption levels. We have:
@h111()
@c11
+ (e11)
h
@h112()
@c11
  @h111()@c11
i
= @h211()@c21 + (e

21)
h
@h212()
@c21
  @h211()@c21
i
Given that ` = 1 and e21 > e

11, the e¤ect, on the transformed CCPERLE,
of a rise in rst-period consumption in case of premature death is larger for
2-type agents than for 1-type agents. Hence
@h111()
@c11
< @h211()@c21 . Note that
the marginal e¤ect, on the transformed CCPERLE, of a rise in cij is always
larger for short-lived than for long-lived. Thus, the second terms of the LHS
and RHS are negative. Moreover, given d21 > d

11, we expect that the e¤ect,
on the transformed CCPERLE, of a rise in rst-period consumption in case of
long life is larger for 1-type agents than for 2-type agents:
@h112()
@c11
> @h212()@c21 .
Thus the rst term of the RHS exceeds the rst term of the LHS ceteris paribus,
and, in absolute value, the factor in brackets of the LHS is larger than the one
of the RHS. Note that, as e11 < e

21, more weight is assigned to the (negative)
second term of the RHS than to the (negative) second term on the LHS. Thus
the result depends on how large survival chances are.
 If low survival chances, i.e. a low  () for all e¤ort levels, then we have:
c21 > c

11, on the grounds of the larger welfare loss due to a shorter life in
case of patient agents, even though that loss is less likely than for impatient
agents, who make less e¤ort.
 If high survival chances, i.e. a high  () for all e¤ort levels, then we have:
c21 < c

11, on the grounds of the more likely welfare loss for impatient
agents, as these make less e¤ort, even though that loss is less sizeable
than for patient agents.
Regarding other rst-period consumption levels, we have:
@h111()
@c11
+ (e11)
h
@h112()
@c11
  @h111()@c11
i
= @h121()@c12 + (e

12)
h
@h122()
@c12
  @h121()@c12
i
In case of short life, the marginal gain from rst period consumption is
larger for agents who have, ceteris paribus, the lowest CCPERLE, i.e. agents
who like e¤ort. Hence @h111()@c11 <
@h121()
@c12
ceteris paribus. In case of long-lived
agents, we also have @h112()@c11 <
@h122()
@c12
. However, given that the marginal e¤ect,
on the transformed CCPERLE, of a rise in cij is always larger for short-lived
than for long-lived, the terms in brackets are negative. Note, however, that, as
@h111()
@c11
< @h121()@c12 and
@h112()
@c11
< @h122()@c12 , the two factors in brackets are likely
to be very close to each others. Hence, the rst terms will drive the optimal
allocation of resources at the young age. Given @h111()@c11 <
@h121()
@c12
, we obtain
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that: c11 < c

12, since short-lived agents who like e¤ort have larger marginal
welfare gains from more consumption, in comparison to e¤ort-averse agents.
Following a similar rationale, we obtain also: c21 < c

22.
9.9 Proof of Proposition 7
Here again, the FOCs of the social planners problem are the same as above, ex-
cept that hij1(cij ; eij)  gfij1 (cij ; eij) and hij2(cij ; dij;eij)  gfij2 (cij ; dij ; eij),
where f

U1ij
1+i

 fij1 (cij ; eij) and f

U2ij
1+i

 fij2 (cij ; dij ; eij).
From the last four FOCs, we obtain, as above: e12 = e

22 = e > e

21 > e

11 >
0.
Let us now combine, for a given type ij, the FOCs for optimal consump-
tion at the young age and at the old age: @hij1()@cij   (e

ij )
@hij1()
@cij
=
@hij2()
@dij
 
(eij )
@hij2()
@cij
. Given that h  g  f

U`ij
1+i

is concave, we have that @hij1()@cij >
@hij2()
@cij
ceteris paribus. Hence, the above condition requires @hij1()@cij >
@hij2()
@dij
.
Such an inequality rules out, given the concavity of u(), cases where dij is too
low. Hence dij > c.
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Note also that @hij1()@cij + (e

ij )
h
@hij2()
@cij
  @hij1()@cij
i
=
@hij2()
@dij
. Hence, given
that @hij2()@cij  
@hij1()
@cij
< 0, it follows that: @hij1()@cij >
@hij2()
@dij
, implying cij > d

ij ,
that is, declining consumption proles along the lifecycle.
Regarding second-period consumption, we also have: @h112()@d11 =
@h122()
@d12
=
@h212()
@d21
= @h222()@d22 . Here again, given the concavity of h(), and given that
patient agents have, ceteris paribus, a higher marginal gain from second-period
consumption, we expect d2j > d

1j . The same is true, at the optimum, for e¤ort-
loving agents, so that we expect di2 > d

i1 . Hence we have: d

22 > d

12; d

21 >
d11 > c.
Let us now compare rst-period consumption levels. We have:
@h111()
@c11
+ (e11)
h
@h112()
@c11
  @h111()@c11
i
= @h211()@c21 + (e

21)
h
@h212()
@c21
  @h211()@c21
i
Given that ` = 2 and e21 > e

11, the e¤ect, on the transformed CCPERLE,
of a rise in rst-period consumption in case of premature death is larger for
2-type agents than for 1-type agents. Hence
@h111()
@c11
< @h211()@c21 . Note that
the marginal e¤ect, on the transformed CCPERLE, of a rise in cij is always
larger for short-lived than for long-lived. Thus, the second terms of the LHS
and RHS are negative. Moreover, given d21 > d

11, we expect that the e¤ect,
on the transformed CCPERLE, of a rise in rst-period consumption in case of
long life is larger for 1-type agents than for 2-type agents:
@h112()
@c11
> @h212()@c21 .
Thus the rst term of the RHS exceeds the rst term of the LHS ceteris paribus,
and, in absolute value, the factor in brackets of the LHS is larger than the one
of the RHS. Note that, as e11 < e

21, more weight is assigned to the (negative)
30Same argument as in the proof of Proposition 2.
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second term of the RHS than to the (negative) second term on the LHS. Thus
the result depends on how large survival chances are.
 If low survival chances, i.e. a low  () for all e¤ort levels, then we have:
c21 > c

11, on the grounds of the larger welfare loss due to a shorter life in
case of patient agents, even though that loss is less likely than for impatient
agents, who make less e¤ort.
 If high survival chances, i.e. a high  () for all e¤ort levels, then we have:
c21 < c

11, on the grounds of the more likely welfare loss for impatient
agents, as these make less e¤ort, even though that loss is less sizeable
than for patient agents.
Regarding other rst-period consumption levels, we have:
@h111()
@c11
+ (e11)
h
@h112()
@c11
  @h111()@c11
i
= @h121()@c12 + (e

12)
h
@h122()
@c12
  @h121()@c12
i
In case of short life, the marginal gain from rst period consumption is
larger for agents who have, ceteris paribus, the lowest CCPERLE, i.e. agents
who dislike e¤ort. Hence @h111()@c11 >
@h121()
@c12
ceteris paribus. In case of long-lived
agents, we also have @h112()@c11 >
@h122()
@c12
. However, given that the marginal e¤ect,
on the transformed CCPERLE, of a rise in cij is always larger for short-lived
than for long-lived, the terms in brackets are negative. Note, however, that, as
@h111()
@c11
> @h121()@c12 and
@h112()
@c11
> @h122()@c12 , the two factors in brackets are likely
to be very close to each others. Hence, the rst terms will drive the optimal
allocation of resources at the young age. Given @h111()@c11 >
@h121()
@c12
, we obtain
that: c11 > c

12, since short-lived agents who dislike e¤ort have larger marginal
welfare gains from more consumption, in comparison to e¤ort-loving agents.
Following a similar rationale, we obtain also: c21 > c

22.
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